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ABSTRACT
HARDWARE MONITORS FOR SECURE PROCESSING IN EMBEDDED OPERATING
SYSTEMS
SEPTEMBER 2015
TEDY MAMMEN THOMAS
B.TECH. E.C., COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
M.S. E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Russell Tessier

Embedded processors are being increasingly used in our daily life and have become
an important part of many types of infrastructure in the world. As people start depending
more on embedded systems for personal and business processing operations, the attacks on
these systems have also been on a rise. Existing defense mechanisms targeted for desktop and
server processors cannot be used to defend embedded systems as these system exhibit
constraints on processing performance and processing power and energy. Thus, embedded
systems require low overhead security approaches to ensure that they are protected from
attacks.
This thesis describes a hardware based approach to monitor the operation of an
embedded processor instruction-by-instruction, where deviations from expected program
behavior are detected within the time associated with the execution of an instruction.
Previous work in this area has focused on monitoring a single task on a CPU while here a
novel hardware monitoring system that can monitor multiple active tasks in an operatingsystem-based platform is presented. This approach doesn’t need any change in application
binary code. The hardware monitor is able to track context switches that occur in the
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operating system and ensure that monitoring is performed continuously, thus ensuring system
security.
This thesis describes the design of the system as well as results obtained from a
prototype implementation of the system on an Altera DE4 FPGA board. It is demonstrated in
hardware that applications can be monitored at instruction level without execution slow-down
and buffer overflow attacks can be defeated using this system. When an attack occurs, it is
detected within a cycle and the attack task is killed before it can harm the system. The system
uses an off-chip DRAM for storing the application binary and the operating system kernel. A
centralized graph memory is implemented on-chip to support the storage of all monitoring
graphs associated with the system. MiBench benchmarks such as qsort, bitcount, stringmatch,
basicmath and dijkstra are used to evaluate the system.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Embedded processing systems are widely used and are key technology for control
systems, the Internet of Things, personal health monitoring, home automation, and many
other application domains. Figure 1 illustrates the rise in the usage of embedded devices. Due
to their wide use and the importance of their tasks, embedded systems needs to be protected
from hacking attacks. With an increasing number of embedded systems being connected to
networks, one typical attack against embedded systems is through the global Internet.

Figure 1: Embedded devices installed base forecast [11]

Many embedded systems are based on general-purpose processing systems that are
vulnerable to the same types of attacks as conventional desktop and server computers, albeit
for a different set of applications. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [24] shows
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that around 10% of vulnerabilities (6518 out of 66,399) in systems are related to overflows
that can be exploited via a network. Many of these overflows then enable an attacker to
execute malicious code. Thus, this thesis focuses on protecting embedded systems from this
important type of attack. Figure 2 illustrates a denial of service attack generated in-network
by exploiting this inherent vulnerability of embedded network processors [8].

packet processing system in data plane
network processor

processor
core

memory

interconnect

processor
core

endsystem

processor

memory

off-chip memory

off-chip memory

memory interface

processor
core

memory interface

control
processor

memory

core
attack

I/O interface

network interface

switch fabric interface

packet

router

router

endsystem
router

router

router

Internet

endsystem

Figure 2: Attack on packet processing system in network router data plane [8]

While desktop and server computers have the processing power to run malware
detection software (e.g., virus scanner, intrusion detection software, etc.), embedded systems
are typically not able to do so due to resource constraints (e.g., limited power budget, limited
processing capacity, etc.). Instead, hardware-based protection mechanisms have been
2

developed, in particular “hardware monitors”, as illustrated in Figure 3. These monitors look
for deviations from expected processor behavior using run time processing information. In
case of an attack, the monitor detects deviation from expected behavior and a suitable
recovery process is initiated.

Embedded System

Data
Memory

Instruction
Memory

Embedded Processor

Hardware Monitor
Run Time Information

Comparison
Logic

Expected
Program
Behavior

Monitor Controller
Recovery Measures

Figure 3: Embedded processor system with hardware monitor

A variety of different hardware-based solutions have been proposed to protect
embedded processing systems. In general, there have been two shortcomings in existing work:


Monitoring on systems with complex workloads is based on coarse indicators (e.g.,
function call sequence). This approach leaves the system vulnerable to attacks that
happen between these indicators (e.g., within a function call).



Fine-grained monitoring systems do not support multi-task workloads on operating
systems. This constraint limits the applicability of this single-task monitoring systems to
specialized domains (e.g., embedded control systems, network processors, etc.).
To make hardware monitors an effective protection mechanism for attacks on

embedded systems in any application domain, it is critical to develop fine-grained monitoring
on multi-task embedded systems. In this work, the design of a hardware monitoring system
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that coordinates with the task switching dynamics of an operating system to verify every
instruction executed by applications is presented. This approach neither requires any changes
to application binary, nor detection software in the operating system. Thus the processor core
defense can be implemented efficiently and is backward compactable with the existing
embedded system code. The result from this thesis can aid in defending the embedded
processing systems from various different domains and make them more enduring against an
increasing range of attacks.
1.1. Attacks and Defenses in Embedded Systems
Many important functions in today’s global infrastructure are implemented using
embedded systems. The value of the data being processed in embedded systems and the
operations they perform are enough reasons for attacks to target these systems. Some of the
major motivations towards the attacks on embedded systems are information theft, energy
drainage, confusion of the sensor, device reprogramming, network intrusion, physical
intrusion, etc [25].
The focus of this thesis is on code injection attacks, where malicious code is injected
remotely (e.g., via a network). This type of attack is extensively used in practice. Stuxnet [19]
is very popular example of this type of attack which led to the physical destruction of
embedded controllers because malicious code was injection into them. Although, Stuxnet is a
very complex example based on embedded systems with advanced operating systems, there
are also examples for low-end embedded systems such as smart cards and RFID chips [32].
The typical characteristics of embedded systems such as limited processing
performance and battery power make conventional software-based defenses, such as virus
scanners or other intrusion detection system, unsuitable. Particularly in real-time
environments, it is not acceptable to account for the unknown processing overhead of
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malware detection software. Also, considerable portions of the energy budget of an
embedded system maybe required by software-based malware detection.
In this work, the design of the hardware-based protection mechanism is such that it
doesn’t come in the way of the operation of the embedded system, which still being able to
reliably detect any attack that changes the operation of the system. The hardware monitoring
system, in particular, does not slow down the embedded processor nor does it require any
changes to the application binary.
Prior work that has proven effective in detecting code injection attacks [7, 17] forms
the basis of this thesis. The focus of prior work was on network processing systems, a certain
type of embedded system with single-threaded workload. This thesis focuses on the
expansion of this work to make it practical for real-time embedded systems with multiplethreaded workloads that are controlled by an operating system (OS).
The goal of this thesis is to develop a Multi-task Hardware Monitor (MTHM) system
that can protect modern embedded processors with real-time performance constraints from
attacks that are targeted at vulnerabilities in embedded system. The specific contributions of
this thesis are:


Design of a Multi-task Hardware Monitor system that supports multi-tasking contexts and
that operates in sync with an embedded operating system.



Design of a centralized graph memory circuitry for the storage of all monitoring graphs
associated with the embedded processor core and its interface to the Multi-task Hardware
Monitor system.



Embedded system recovery when an attack is detected by the Multi-task Hardware
Monitor system.
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Prototype implementation of the system on an Altera DE4 board using DRAM for
application storage.



Evaluation of the prototype and demonstration of system protection from stack smashing
attack.

1.2. Organization of the document
The rest of the thesis document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief
overview of the background and related work. Chapter 3 describes the system and security
model that is representative of the embedded system that can be attacked remotely. Chapter 4
describes the operating system management in the embedded system and Chapter 5 discusses
the system architecture. Chapter 6 explains the prototype implementation and Chapter 7
concludes the thesis with directions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

This chapter provides a brief review of related work that provides context for the
research. We will also look into the implementation details of the single-task monitoring
system and see how this work needs to be expanded to monitoring of multi-task embedded
systems.
2.1. Related work
2.1.1. Security Issues in Embedded Processor
A variety of techniques can be used to attack an embedded processor [25]. Physical
security can be achieved by employing tamper resistant designs as described by Ravi et al.
[31]. Embedded processors are also susceptible to side-channel attacks (e.g., differential
power analysis [16]), although it is not considered in this work. Embedded systems are also
exposed to remote attacks in a networked framework as considered by Wood et al. [39]. Most
of the time, these attacks take advantage of weakness in user software to take control of
embedded processor operation. Repetitive messages are often sent to entice the processor to
reveal secret information [31], especially if cryptographic protections are weak. Malicious
code can also be inserted if the security is weak, in which case, an embedded processor is retasked [25]. Processor debug and test ports are used by other software attacks to extract vital
processor information [33].
2.1.2. Monitoring Systems
Constrained programming environments for embedded processors have been
proposed to address security concerns [14]. However, a full and diverse programming
environment is required by many embedded processors. The usage of these approaches for
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security can lead to high overhead in embedded operating systems. Advanced techniques
such as multiple independent levels of security (MILS) [26] are used by comprehensive
embedded processor software systems to effectively isolate different processes and their data.
In low-overhead embedded systems with minimal OS capabilities, this additional security
layer may not be appropriate. In this work, security is achieved by monitoring processor
execution. Monitoring has been used also in system by Arora et al. [3] and the IMPRES
system [29], but a fine-granularity of monitoring is used by our monitor. Information is
collected across multiple executed instructions in determining if the operation is valid in
SAFE-OPS system by Zambreno et al. [40]. Attacks and errors can be detected by this system
at the end of such a sequence, whereas our monitor can immediately detect the first
instruction that deviates from expected behavior.
A control flow graph for monitoring program execution is also used by Abadi et al.
[1]. Integrity checks were introduced into the micro-architecture by Nakka et al. and the
system used special check instructions [23]. In the system by Ragel et al. [30],
microinstructions are introduced to monitor fault detection, return address checks and
memory boundary checks. Unlike this, our monitor doesn’t require any changes in the
machine code to implement the necessary checks. A general, hardware-based architecture is
developed by Goginat et al. [12] to protect embedded systems against a range of attacks.
Chen et al. [9] proposes a log-base architecture (LBA) approach for monitoring using
multiple processor cores. An unmodified program is run on one core while special monitoring
hardware records all executed instructions in a log that scans for attacks and failures by
software on another core. This architecture is very powerful and can detect a range of
problems, but requires large log buffers [10]. This may introduce serious limitations in
embedded system and also delay attack detection. Our monitor is able to detect deviations in
operation within one instruction and is thus more suitable.
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Various other security approaches have been directed at embedded processor
execution. One of them involves tagging of non-instruction memory pages with NX (No
eXecute) or XD (eXecute Disable) bits. By doing so, control flow change to a piece of code
that belongs to data memory is prevented. This technique is useful in preventing buffer
overflow attacks. A similar purpose is served by pre-set values placed on the stack called
stack canaries. Before control flow change, these values are checked to verify that specific
locations (e.g., a return address) have not been modified [28]. Shao et al. [34] describes
another technique to defend against buffer overflow attacks, where bound checks are used
and function pointers are protected by XORing them with a secret key. Although, none of
these approaches consider a case where an attacker tires to overwrites instruction memory.
Zhang et al. propose the use of co-processors to monitor operating system kernel data
structure [41]. In this approach, a hardware co-processor is implemented separately. The idea
of information flow is used to determine if data is authentic or malicious in the system
proposed by Suh et al. [37]. Alternatively, embedded operating systems can create a separate
task to evaluate the control flow of multiple tasks [28]. However, these types of systems
require the design of a complex operating system and its integration with the processor.
Advanced security approaches such as virus scanners and trusted execution hardware which
are found in general-purpose computers are not appropriate for many low-end embedded
systems. The solution presented in this work has simple interfaces to the micro-architecture.
Our system uses dedicated hardware monitors to monitor the system and reduce the
vulnerability of the system without using any user-level code.
2.1.3. Recovery
A large portion of prior work related to embedded processor recovery has focused on
recovery from hardware faults rather than external attacks. Soft errors in the processor
datapath are detected and recovered with minimal performance loss using datapath
9

redundancy in the system proposed by Bournoutian et al. [5]. The concept of checkpoints and
rollbacks [27] are used in many embedded processors in the presence of detected faults,
which leads to fast recovery. These approaches are effective for the occasional soft errors, but
are insufficient for a targeted attack. Unused processors in a multi-core network are used to
provide redundancy in the system by Luo and Fan [20]. So even if a specific core fails,
processing is moved to an idle core. Although all these techniques are effective, none of them
address monitoring and recovery from network attacks.
2.1.4. Embedded Processor Context Switch
The frequent context switching in embedded processors has made the use of task
monitoring complicated. Numerous prior approaches have been developed to reduce the
impact of context switches on real time behavior. Some of these approaches are applicable to
the saving of monitor state. Isolation of possible context switches to points in a task when the
live sets of registers are at a minima was proposed by Zhou et al. [42]. This can accelerate
context switch time because these points reduce the amount of register information which
must be saved. Alternatively, by breaking down larger task into smaller ones, it is possible to
reduce the need for pre-emptive context-switching [4]. But the need to schedule many small
tasks could be a challenge for an embedded operating system. Multiple threads can be
compressed into a single thread as another extreme approach [35]. Although this would
increase resource usage as this eliminates thread switching and all tasks must be compiled
and monitored together.
2.2. Single-Task Monitoring System
This section describes the working of the single-task monitoring system which has
been proven effective in defending network processors from network attacks [17]. Network
processors are designed to execute network applications (e.g. IPv4) effectively and consist of
a single-threaded workload. Since it is critical to detect deviation in expected behavior of the
10

application within a single cycle, it is important that the monitor is able to retrieve the next
state information of every instruction which is being monitored within a single cycle. The
monitoring graph is essentially a state-machine where each instruction is represented by a
state and an edge represents the transition from the instruction to its next valid instruction. A
4-bit hash of the instruction is used to label these edges and it helps in reducing the size of the
monitoring graph. The monitoring graph is generated using the application binary as shown
in Figure 4.

[…]
49c:
4a0:
4a4:
4a8:
4ac:
4b0:
4b4:
4b8:
[…]

49c
97c20010
00000000
2c420033
1440000a
00000000
3c026666
34430191
97c20010

lhu
nop
sltiu
bnez
nop
lui
ori
lhu

v0,16(s8)

0
4a0

7
4a4

v0,v0,51
v0,4d4

11
4a8

10
6

v0,0x6666
v1,v0,0x191
v0,16(s8)

4ac

10
4b0

7
4b4

4d4

3
4b8

Figure 4: State machine generation from processing binary [17]

However, the next instructions from a control flow instruction share the same hash
value and it leads to non-determinism in the monitoring graph. This non-determinism gets
multiplied if the control flow instructions continue and it can lead to a complex
implementation of the monitoring graph. Figure 5 illustrates such a scenario where state 3
and 5 can be reached from state 2 for input condition c. This problem is addressed by
converting the non-deterministic graph into a deterministic graph by using powerset
construction. Figure 6 illustrates the deterministic graph for the corresponding nondeterministic graph after powerset construction. It can be seen that states 3 and 5 are
combined into a single state {3,5} and can be reached from state 2 for input condition c.
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Figure 5: NFA state machine [17]
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Figure 6: DFA state machine using powerset construction [17]

As mentioned earlier, it is critical that state transitions are implemented with one
memory access per instruction and hence all necessary information is encoded in a single
table entry and the states are grouped by the number of outgoing edges, i.e. a state belongs to
group g if its previous state has g outgoing edges. For example, groups are shown with
different colors in Figure 7. It can be seen in the figure that a state can belong to multiple
groups (state f belongs to group 2 because a has two outgoing edges and to group 3 because
e has three outgoing edges).
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Figure 7: Grouping of states [17]
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Figure 8 shows the system architecture of the single-task monitoring system. Each
entry in the memory contains a sequence of number of next states, offset in state group, valid
hash values on outgoing edges and the memory is logically divided into groups. A register
file with 16 entries stores the base address for each group. The hash comparison logic
determines if the one-hot coded hash bit of the incoming processor instruction is set in the
valid hash values read from the memory and calculates the value of k, which is the position of
matching hash among the valid hash values. If the one-hot coded hash bit is not set, then it
means an illegal operation has taken place, indicating an attack and recovery measures are
initiated. Otherwise, the next state transition is found by multiplying the number of next
states and offset in state group and adding it to group base address and the value of k. Thus,
by just one memory access, it is possible to determine the state-transition. The representation
of the graph memory is compact and ensures high performance implementation of the
hardware monitoring system. The single-task hardware monitoring system is able to reliably
detect and recover from an attack without reducing the processing performance of the
processor core.
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Figure 8: Memory representation of DFA monitoring graph [17]
13

group 1

group 2

group 3

However, this approach can only be applied for ensuring security in single-thread
processor cores and is not sufficient to provide security for a real-time embedded processor
with multi-threaded workload. Hence it is necessary to develop a Multi-task Hardware
Monitor system that can coordinate with the embedded system to enable dynamic context
switches and recovery when attacks are detected.
2.3. Summary
This chapter introduced related work that is essential for understanding the prototype
system. Also a brief overview of the background work was provided. The next chapter
outlines the system and security model used for this work.
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM & SECURITY MODEL

To provide the necessary context for the Multi-Task Hardware Monitor system design
presented in Chapter 5, the operation of MTHM and the security model for this work is
briefly discussed [38].
3.1 Secure Processing with Hardware Monitors
Hardware monitors are components that are co-located with processor cores to track
processing of software on that core. The objective is to access the operation of the processor
and determine when incorrect behavior is detected (which can be due to faults or malicious
attacks). As discussed in related work, there are a number of different approaches to
monitoring based on what information is communicated from the processor to the monitor
and what information is used to determine if that behavior is normal.
In this work, the hardware monitor receives information about every instruction
executed on the processor core and compares it to a monitoring graph that is based on the
analysis of the processing binary (similar to [21]). Each instruction is represented by a 4-bit
hash value (to reduce the size of the monitoring graph compared to the size of the binary) and
the state transitions correspond to possible control flow paths between the instructions. We
use a deterministic finite automation (DFA) representation of the monitoring graph as
described in Chapter 2.
The system architecture of the Multi-Task Hardware Monitor systems which supports
multiple tasks is illustrated in Figure 9. The figure shows that application binaries are
analyzed offline. During runtime, the comparison logic in MTHM matches the monitoring
graph to the currently active task on the processor. To do the operation, the OS-to-Monitor
Interface (OMI) communicates the necessary context information between the processor and
15

the monitor. When the processor execution does not match the expected behavior reflected in
the monitoring graph of the current task, a task reset signal is sent from the monitor to the
processor to terminate the current task.

monitoring
graph

processing code
instruction memory

mon. graph
mon. memory

processor
core
OS or active task

hash of
processing
instruction
context info
task reset

comparison
logic
active graph

hardware monitor

embedded processor

offline
analysis
runtime operation

...

...

processing code
binary

task context
data memory
I/O interface

Figure 9: System architecture of Multi-Task Hardware Monitor system
It is important to note that the hardware monitoring system is isolated from the
processor and thus cannot be tampered with remotely by the attacker (e.g., to change the
monitoring graphs to match an attack). Related work discusses how to achieve such isolation
while still enabling dynamic installation of hardware monitoring graphs through the use of
cryptographic mechanisms [15].
It is to be noted that this thesis do not consider intrusion detection heuristics, which
may be slow and computationally expensive. Instead, a novel multi-task monitoring system

16

that can detect deviations from normal processing with a single instruction is presented. Such
fast detection is important for real-time embedded systems since the processing time for tasks
may be only a few microsecond.
3.2. Operating System Interaction and Recovery
Operating systems are used in embedded systems to manage workloads that consist of
multiple tasks that dynamically become active on various cores of the system. The system
uses operating system to enable the coordination between the processor and hardware
monitor as described above. When a context switch happens, the monitoring state needs to be
saved, just like processor state needs to be saved in the processor core. Also we need to
ensure that this coordination doesn’t slow down the processor. The monitor can support
multiple tasks running on the core without interfering with the real-time operation of the
embedded system. Chapter 4 describes in detail the design of the OS-to-monitor
communication mechanism in the system.
In addition, OS also assists in recovery steps when an attack is detected by the
monitoring hardware since these recovery operations cannot easily be customized in
hardware. Different applications require different levels of recovery (e.g., a simple processor
reset for network operations or complex check-pointing for transaction-style processing). It is
to be noted that the change in OS to support hardware monitoring and recovery is the only
change to any software in the embedded system. In the system, on detection of deviation
from expected processing behavior, the hardware monitor notifies the OS to kill the currently
active task. The attack code is terminated by executing an Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) to
kill the task. After terminating the malicious task, the embedded processor continues its
normal operation and starts executing the next high ready task. Figure 10 illustrates the attack
detection and recovery process in the embedded OS. Thus, the recovery process in the system
doesn’t affect other tasks running on the embedded processor core.
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Figure 10: Attack detection and system recovery

3.3. Security Model
To justify how the system provides a secure processing environment, the security
model that is basis for this work is discussed briefly.
3.3.1. Attack Example
In this work, the focus is on the class of attacks that aim to change the processing
behavior of the embedded system. This class of attack is very board and encompasses a
number of specific attacks. Hence one specific example is illustrated, but note that many
other attacks are covered by this work.
In this scenario, the I/O functionality of the embedded system is used to cause the
embedded processor to misbehave. Intentional modification of processor stack (e.g., stack
smashing) is used to generate this type of attack. By making a controlled change in the stack,
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it is possible for an attacker to change the control flow such that malicious code is executed.
This type of attack is very common and is used in Internet to gain access to end-systems via
vulnerable software. Code Red worm is one of the most famous example for this kind of
attack that exploited a vulnerability in a service of the Windows operating system and used it
to spread itself around the globe [6, 22]. As the growth of embedded systems increases, these
types of attacks will continue to spread. In our prototype implementation, a similar attack
code is used to test the system.
3.3.2. Security Requirements
It is required that the system meets the following security requirements:


SC1: The system should only allow execution of code as programmed in the executable
binaries of each task.



SC2: Secure processing should be provided for multiple, dynamically changing tasks.



SC3: Malicious code execution in one task should not affect other tasks.
In addition to security, these are also practical performance requirements. As it is

shown in the results, the hardware monitor does not reduce the performance of the embedded
processor in any way. The only overhead is a few instructions in the operating system code
when switching tasks, which lead to a negligible reduction in processing speed.
3.3.3. Attacker Capabilities
The following assumptions are made about the capabilities of an attacker that tries to
change the operation of the embedded system and/or tries to execute malicious code on the
embedded system:


AC1: An attacker can provide any input through input/output interface of the embedded
system.
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AC2: An attacker can start and stop any task from an installed binary in the embedded
system (within the limitation of a maximum number of active tasks).



AC3: An attacker can tamper with any of the binaries.
In order to provide a practical solution for secure processing in an embedded system,

we also require some reasonable constraints on attacker capabilities:


AC4: An attacker cannot tamper with the operating system itself.



AC5: An attacker cannot tamper with the hardware monitoring system (e.g., modifying
monitoring graphs for installed executables)
As discussed above, this proposal does not discuss the secure installation of

monitoring graphs, which has been solved in related work [15], in more detail. Next chapter
provides a comprehensive discussion on the operating system management which is one of
the key aspects in this research.
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CHAPTER 4
OPERATING SYSTEM MANAGEMENT

In this chapter, we discuss about the OS activities which are communicated to the
Multi-Task Hardware Monitor for its smooth operation. Task creation, context switch and
task delete are the three operations whose information is vital to the Multi-Task Hardware
Monitor. This chapter also talks about how the operating system communicates with the
hardware monitor and keeps the monitor updated about its activities.
4.1. Processor Interface
The processor interface is a set of four registers created for communication between
the operating system and the hardware monitor. Whenever task create or context switch or
task delete occurs, the operating system writes into these registers regarding the details of the
operation. The hardware monitor reads these registers to take necessary action to coordinate
with the operating system as explained in Chapter 5. Figure 11 shows a simple block diagram
of the processor interface.
Processor Interface
3-Enable

Operating
System

2-PID

Hardware
Monitor

1-GID
0-Operation

Figure 11: Processor interface

The Operation register is used to indicate what operation is happening in the OS. 0x01
indicates a task create, 0x02 indicates a context switch and 0x03 indicates a task delete. The
GID register is used to write the graph ID (GID) of the newly created task in case of a task
21

create operation. The GID of a process is used to identify various graphs located in the
hardware monitor. Section 5.3 explains in detail the role of GID in the system architecture.
The PID register is used to write the process ID (PID) of the new task in case of a task create
or PID of the newly scheduled task in case of a context switch or PID of the deleted task in
case of a task delete. Whenever the Operation register is read by the hardware monitor, it
flushes its content to acknowledge that it has been read. This also helps in avoiding any
confusion when multiple task create or context switch or task delete operations happen
consecutively. The Enable register is used to inform the hardware monitor if an OS activity is
going on in the operating system or program execution is happening. If an OS operation is
being executed on the processor, then this register is set to 0x0 and the hardware monitor
need not monitor these instructions since we know that the operating system is secure and
cannot be tampered with by an attacker. Once the program execution starts, this register is set
to 0x1 and the hardware monitor begins to monitor the processor instructions. Thus, this
register is used to enable/disable the hardware monitor.
4.2. Task Creation
A task/process is a simple program running on the CPU. In µC/OS-II, each task is
given a unique priority and has its own set of CPU registers and stack. When a new task is
created in µC/OS-II, it is assigned a task control block (TCB), which is a data structure used
by µC/OS-II to maintain the state of a task when it is preempted. Figure 12 illustrate how
multiple tasks are handled in µC/OS-II [18]. Multiple tasks reside in the memory and when a
task is scheduled to run next, its TCB contents are moved to the CPU registers (context) for
its execution.
The user creates a new task by calling OSTaskCreate( ). This function requires four
arguments: a pointer to the task code, a pointer to the argument that is passed to the task,
pointer to the top of the stack that is assigned to task and the desired priority of the task. In
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µC/OS-II, the priority of the task acts as the process ID since each task has a unique priority.
The OSTaskCreate( ) is modified such that whenever a task create occurs, the hardware
monitor is notified about it. The OSTaskCreate( ) also reports the PID and GID to the
hardware monitor. Since task create is an operating system activity, the Enable register is set
to 0x0 before entering this function.

Figure 12: Multiple tasks in µC/OS-II [18]

Figure 13 illustrates how the hardware monitor is notified of task creation. In this
figure, it can be seen that the operation register is set to 0x1 to indicate a task create.
Corresponding GID and PID are also written into the respective registers (in this case, GID
and PID are both the priority of the task).
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IINT8U OSTaskCreate (void (*task)(void *p_arg), void *p_arg, OS_STK *ptos, INT8U prio)
{
......
......
IOWR(PROCESSOR_INTERFACE, 1, prio);
IOWR(PROCESSOR_INTERFACE, 2, prio);
IOWR(PROCESSOR_INTERFACE, 0, 1);

// Report GID of new task
// Report PID of new task
// Report a task create operation

......
......
}

Figure 13: Reporting task create in software

4.3. Context Switch
A context switch happens when the OS kernel decides to run a different process on
the CPU. A context switch is triggered by an OS event or a timer. Before this can happen, the
OS needs to save the current task’s context (CPU registers) in its stack and restore the new
task’s context from its stack. The priority of each task decides which task needs to run next.
Once the next task for execution is determined, the operating system initiates the context
switch process. The scheduler decides which task to run next. Like most commercial realtime OS, µC/OS-II uses a preemptive type of kernel, which means whenever a higher priority
task is ready to run, the current active task is suspended and the higher priority task is given
control of the CPU [18]. Figure 14 shows the context of the CPU registers being saved into
the TCB of the current task (OSTCBCur) during a context switch. Next, the higher priority
task (OSTCBHighRdy) is made the current task (OSTCBCur) and the states of this task are
restored into the CPU registers as shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 14: Context save of suspended task [18]

Figure 15: Context restore of next task [18]
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In µC/OS-II, OS_Sched( ) is used to determine the next task which is ready to run and
this function is modified to notify the hardware monitor about context switch and PID of the
next task. As before, a context switch is an operating system activity and hence the Enable
register is set to 0x0 before entering this function. In Figure 16, it can be seen that the
OS_Sched( ) writes 0x2 into the Operation register to indicate a context switch and also writes
the PID of the next task into the PID register (which in this case is OSPrioHighRdy).

void OS_Sched (void)
{
......
......
IOWR(PROCESSOR_INTERFACE, 2,OSPrioHighRdy);
// Report PID of next task
IOWR(PROCESSOR_INTERFACE, 0, 2);
// Report a context switch operation
......
......
}

Figure 16: Reporting context switch in software

4.4. Task Delete
Sometimes we need to delete a task because it is no longer required to run on the
processor or because it is identified as a malicious task. Deleting a task returns it to a dormant
state and the task is no longer scheduled by µC/OS-II [18]. A task can be deleted by calling
OSTaskDel( ). PID of the task to be deleted is given as the argument to this function. Once
the task is deleted, its associated OS_TCB is freed and can be used by another task to be
created.
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void OSTaskDel (INT8U prio)
{
......
......
IOWR(PROCESSOR_INTERFACE, 2, prio);
IOWR(PROCESSOR_INTERFACE, 0, 3);

// Report PID of deleted task
// Report a task delete operation

......
......
}

Figure 17: Reporting task delete in software

It is necessary to inform the monitor about a task delete as it helps in removing
redundant graph information from the monitor and creates space for another monitoring
graph. It can be seen in Figure 17 that the OSTaskDel( ) is modified to communicate the
necessary task delete information to the monitor. 0x3 is written into the Operation register to
indicate a task delete and the PID (prio) of the deleted task is written into the PID register.
The Enable register is set to 0x0 before entering OSTaskDel( ) since task delete is an OS
activity.
4.5. Summary
This chapter talked about how the OS communicates with the hardware monitor. Also
the role of processor interface in signaling the monitor about the OS activity was discussed.
Next chapter explains in detail the system architecture and how the monitor behaves to
signals received from OS.
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CHAPTER 5
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

In this chapter, the system architecture for the system is presented. This chapter talks
about how the activities in the operating system are coordinated with the Multi-Task
Hardware Monitor to ensure continuous tracking of processor operation [38].
5.1. Task Management in the Operating System
A key aspect of our monitoring system is its ability to fit seamlessly within the
context switch operations of a typical operating system. As noted in Chapter 6, the time
required to switch monitoring graphs for different task is significantly less than the typical
time required for other activities in a context switch. In this implementation, graph switching
is synchronized with other OS actions (e.g., register file save and restore) that occur during a
context switch so that user tasks are protected at all times, Typical context switch activities
for embedded operating systems, such as µC/OS-II used for this work include:
1. A timer or other OS event generates an interrupt triggering a context switch.
2. The OS scheduler determines the next process for execution. This implementation uses a
priority based scheme, although round-robin or other schedulers would also be
appropriate.
3. The OS provides the PID of the next process to the monitoring system, triggering a
monitoring graph switch in the monitor. This switch includes monitor state saving for the
process currently being monitored, and a restoration of monitoring state for the next
process.
4. Concurrently, the OS saves process state (registers, program counter, etc.) for the current
task to main memory.
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5. The OS retrieve process state for the next process from main memory and restores it to
processor registers.
6. The OS checks the status of the monitoring system to confirm that the monitor for the
next process is ready to use.
7. The OS sends a trigger to the monitoring system to start monitoring for the newly-loaded
processes.
After the context switch is completed, the processor sends every instruction executed
for the process to the monitoring system. In the next section, we provide a detailed view of
the monitoring system and how it interacts with the processor for steps 3, 5, and 6 above.
5.2. Multi-Task Hardware Monitor System
A detailed view of our monitoring subsystem is shown in Figure 18. The portions of
the monitoring system can be split into monitoring hardware (three boxes in upper left corner
of the figure), which checks the per-instruction operation of the companion processor, graph
memory, which stores states information about monitoring of each process, controller and
processor interface. Design of the controller was done by Arman Pouraghily.
The monitoring hardware checks each processor instruction using information from
the monitoring graphs stored in graph memory. In the figure, graphs for four separate
applications are stored in slots in the graph memory. Each graph includes one row per
instruction, effectively representing expected program control flow as a state machine [17]. A
read address pointer indicates the entry in the graph that corresponds to the instruction that
has just completed execution. During the execution of an instruction, a multi-bit (in this case
4-bit) hash value of the instruction is generated and converted to a one-hot representation.
This one-hot encoding is compared against expected next-instruction hash values (valid hash)
that are stored in the graph entry for the previously executed instruction. Since branch
instructions may have several possible next instructions, and, consequently, several possible
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valid hashes, multiple one-hot valid hash bits may be set per entry. A match of any of these
hashes indicates a valid instruction. If no match occurs, an illegal instruction has been
executed, leading to the generation of a recovery signal which is used by the processor for
process termination.
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Figure 18: Detailed view of multi-context monitoring system

The next read address (memory row) in the monitoring graph is determined using
next state information stored in the current entry, the matched hash value, and information
stored in base address registers which group states based on fanin count [17]. These values
are combined via addition in the sequencing logic box in the figure. The resulting address is
stored in the address pointer and subsequently added to the start address for the appropriate
graph slot for the application (frame address). The implemented monitor requires only one
memory lookup per instruction.
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Effectively, the monitoring information for each process at any given point in
execution is defined by the contents of the address pointer, the monitoring graph for the
process and the contents of the base address registers. If a context switch is requested, these
values must be updated to use values for the requested next process.
5.3. DMA Interface to Centralized Graph Memory
The graph memory shown in Figure 18 stores the monitoring graph information for all
the active processes in the embedded system. However, there are other processes which could
become active at some point later in time whose monitoring graph information is not present
in the graph memory. Hence a centralized graph memory is used to store the monitoring
graph information of all the processes and the monitoring system copies the necessary graph
information from the centralized graph memory when a new process is executed on the
embedded processor system whose graph information is not available in the monitor graph
memory. A new monitoring graph can be securely downloaded into the centralized graph
memory by using the approach mentioned in related work [15]. There are two main reasons
why it is advantageous to have a centralized graph memory instead of storing all the
monitoring graphs in the graph memory of the monitoring system:
1. Downloading new monitoring graphs into the centralized graph memory doesn’t get in
the way of the operation of the hardware monitoring system. New graphs can be
downloaded securely into the system even when the monitoring system is tracking the
embedded processor operation for any deviations.
2. The centralized graph memory can be shared between multiple hardware monitoring
systems to monitor multi-core embedded systems. This can help in reducing the resource
usage of the system. Monitoring systems can avoid storing irredundant graph information
and copy new graph information from the centralized graph memory when needed.
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Figure 19 illustrates the system architecture with centralized graph memory. The
monitoring graphs of the applications are stored in the centralized graph memory. When the
hardware monitor requires a new graph to be loaded into its monitor memory, it informs the
DMA controller and the DMA controller facilitates the graph transfer from the centralized
graph memory to the monitor memory.
A DMA controller as shown in the Figure 20 is used to interface the centralized graph
memory and the monitoring system. When a new process is created in the embedded
processor, the OS reports the GID and the PID of the new process to the hardware monitor.
The hardware monitor checks whether the graph information for this new process is available
in the monitor graph memory. This can be done by checking the GID to frame binding
storage. If not, it sends the GID of the newly created process which is obtained from the
processor interface to the DMA controller. The DMA controller uses this information to
locate the address of the graph in the centralized graph memory using a look-up table in the
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DMA controller. After locating the address of the graph, the DMA controller initiates the
transfer of the graph information from the centralized graph memory to the monitor graph
memory.
The DMA operation begins by setting the DMA_start signal high. The GID of the
graph to be copied is passed to the DMA controller, which is used to locate the address of the
graph in the centralized graph memory. Once the graph is located, the graph transfer
operation is initiated by setting the Write signal high. The address and data of the new graph
are loaded through the DMA_address and DMA_data ports respectively. The time required to
load a new graph from the centralized graph memory to the monitor graph memory depends
on the number of entries in the monitoring graph of the new process since it takes 1 cycle to
copy one memory entry from the centralized graph memory to the monitor graph memory.
Once the graph transfer operation is complete, the DMA_done signal is set high.
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DMA_Start
Write
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Control Signals

Address

Read

DMA_Done
DMA_Addr

Addr/Data
Buffer

DMA_Data
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Figure 20: DMA controller interface
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Centralized Graph Memory

5.4. OS-to-Monitor Interface for Context Switch
In case of a context switch, control information is exchanged between the processor
and the monitoring system. The exchange of monitoring information starts when the
processor writes the PID of the next process into the PID register in the processor interface
of the monitoring system and sets a bit in the Operation register. The monitoring system
control FSM then performs the following actions:
1. The address pointer for the currently executing process is saved in the PID address
storage so that it can be restored for the next invocation of the process.
2. The GID associated with the next process is located in the PID to GID binding storage
using the PID written to the processor interface.
3. If the GID of the next process differs from the ID of the previous one, the base address
registers are loaded with values for the graphs of the next process. These values are
loaded from the graph memory (e.g., Group0 Addr, etc).
4. The GID is used to determine the frame address for the start of the appropriate
monitoring graph in graph memory for the process. This information is stored in the GID
to frame binding storage.
5. The address pointer value for the next process is restored from the PID addresses storage.
6. The Done bit is set in the processor interface indicating that the monitoring system is
now ready to monitor the next process. This bit can be read by the processor.
7. Once all other context switch activity for the next process has concluded (e.g., processor
registers are loaded), the processor sets an Enable bit in the processor interface, restarting
monitoring. The processor waits until this bit set is successfully made, ensuring
synchronization. Instructions of the newly-loaded process are then monitored.
In chapter 6 it is shown that these steps can be performed in 18 clock cycles for our
prototype system.
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5.5. OS-to-Monitor Interface for Process Creation
When a new process is being created by the OS, it is assigned a unique PID and GID
by the operating system. Since many processes of the same application may exist, the GID
may not be unique. The following steps are used to initialize the security monitor for the new
process.
1. The two identifiers (GID and PID) are passed to the monitor via the processor interface.
The monitor first searches for an empty slot in the PID addresses storage and PID to GID
binding storage to insert the new bindings.
2. While making these associations, the GID to frame binding storage is searched to
determine if the appropriate graph is already loaded. If it is available, the next step is
skipped.
3. If the GID is not found in the GID to frame binding storage, the GID is inserted into the
table. The new graph is then loaded from the centralized graph memory using the DMA
interface. Following graph loading, the base addresses are updated.
4. The Done bit is set in the processor interface indicating that the monitoring system is
now ready to monitor the next process. This bit can be read by the processor.
During system startup, monitoring graphs are loaded from an external centralized
graph memory for the new processes that will be executed by the processor. If a new process
replaces an existing one, the PID addresses, PID to GID binding, GID to frame binding, and
graph memory are updated to include information about the new process. This update is made
via the Control FSM. Concurrently, the processor performs a series of process creation
operations including initialization of the process stack and control block (registers, etc.). In
Chapter 6, it is noted that while process creation can require hundreds of cycles for the
processor, if the appropriate monitoring graph is already in the monitoring graphs is already
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in the monitoring system, monitoring information update for process creation requires 20
cycles for the monitoring system.
5.6. OS-to-Monitor Interface for Process Deletion
When a process is deleted by the OS, the processor writes the PID of the deleted
process into the PID register in the processor interface of the monitoring system and sets a bit
in the Operation register. The following steps are used to remove the corresponding
monitoring graph information from the monitoring system.
1. The PID of the deleted process is passed to the monitor via the processor interface. The
monitor first searches for a matching entry in PID addresses storage and PID to GID
binding storage. If found, the valid pointer for that corresponding PID is set to 0.
2. The GID associated with the deleted process is located in the PID to GID binding storage
using the PID written to the processor interface. The number of active processes for that
GID is decremented by 1 in the GID to frame binding storage
3. The Done bit is set in the processor interface indicating that the monitoring system is
now ready to monitor the next process. This bit can be read by the processor.
While loading new graph information from the centralized graph memory, PID
addresses storage and PID to GID binding storage rows with 0 set for valid pointer are
considered as empty rows and can be used by the new graph for updating its information.
Thus, at any given moment, the hardware monitoring system can support monitoring of four
active processes in the system.
5.7. Dual-core Monitoring System Design
In this section, we explain how the Multi-Task Hardware Monitor system can be
extended to monitor dual-core embedded processors. The architecture of the dual-core
monitoring system is illustrated in Figure 21. Two MTHM systems are co-located with the
dual-core embedded processor to track the processing of the software on individual cores as
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in the case of a single-core monitoring system. The centralized graph memory is shared
among both the MTHM systems and graphs can be loaded into the monitoring systems when
required without slowing down the embedded system.
An arbiter is used to access the centralized graph memory. When a monitoring system
needs to copy a new graph from the centralized graph memory, it requests the arbiter to grant
access to the centralized graph memory. If the centralized graph memory is free, then the
arbiter grants access to the requesting monitoring system. If the centralized graph memory is
busy, then the monitoring system requesting access waits until the centralized graph memory
becomes free. If both the monitors make a request at the same time, priority is given to
Monitor1 by default.
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Figure 21: Dual-core monitoring system
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When Monitor1 needs to copy a new graph from the centralized graph memory, it sets
the Req1 signal high. The arbiter on receiving this request from Monitor1, checks whether the
centralized graph memory is used by Monitor2. The centralized graph memory is currently
busy if the DMA_Done port in Figure 20 is low. If not, then the arbiter establishes a
connection between the DMA interface and Monitor1 and the necessary graph can be
transferred from the centralized graph memory to Monitor1. Now if suppose, Monitor2 also
needs to copy a new graph from the centralized graph memory, it sets the Req2 signal high.
The arbiter receives this request and on checking the DMA_Done port, it finds out that the
centralized graph memory is currently being used by Monitor1. The arbiter waits until the
centralized graph memory is free and then establishes a connection between the DMA
interface and Monitor2.
In Chapter 6, it is noted that process creation requires 600 cycles in the embedded
processor while process creation in monitor requires on an average 140 cycles. Hence, even if
one monitoring system has to wait till the other monitoring system finishes copying the graph,
the waiting monitoring system will still have enough time to copy the necessary graph before
process creation is finished in the embedded processor.
All task management activities such as process creation and context management and
its interface to the monitoring system remains the same as in the case of the single-core
monitoring system. This approach can also be extended to monitor multi-core embedded
systems as the arbiter can manage multiple requests to the centralized graph memory. Priority
of the process can be used to determine which monitor gets access to the centralized graph
memory when multiple requests are made at the same time.
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5.8. Summary
This chapter explained the system architecture for the monitoring system and the
coordination of the operating system activities with the Multi-Task Hardware Monitor. The
graph transfer operation from the centralized graph memory to the monitoring system was
also discussed in this chapter. Finally, this chapter showed how the monitoring system can be
extended to support dual-core embedded systems.
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CHAPTER 6
PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter describes the system setup for the prototype implementation and shows
how monitor context management and task management happens in the system. In the later
sections, the system is verified by an attack code and shows how the monitor can detect the
attack to defend the embedded processor system [38].
6.1. System Setup
To verify the functionality of our monitoring system, we implemented an embedded
NIOS II processor plus monitoring system using a Stratix IV GX230 FPGA located on an
Altera DE4 board. A single-core NIOS executing a µC/OS-II operating system was used for
testing. Monitoring logic and memory were implemented in on-chip resources. Since modern
day embedded processing systems have numerous applications being executed on them, we
have implemented an external DRAM interface to the system and use off-chip DRAM to
support the storage of multiple application binaries and OS kernel. DDR2 SDRAM available
on the Altera DE4 board is used for storing the application binaries and the OS kernel. DDR2
is the second generation DDR and offers a maximum transfer rate of 3200 MB/s. Figure 22
illustrates the DDR2 SDRAM interface system level diagram. An Altera DDR2 controller is
used to handle the complex aspects of using DDR2 SDRAM which includes initializing the
memory devices, managing SDRAM banks and keeping the devices refreshed at appropriate
intervals [2]. Altera DDR2 SDRAM controller can be up to 90% efficient and hence offers a
maximum transfer rate of 2880 MB/s. Figure 23 shows NIOS II setup in Qsys with DRAM
controller interface.
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Figure 22: DDR interface

Figure 23: NIOS II setup in Qsys

Monitoring graphs were generated by passing code through a standard compiler flow
to generate assembly-level instructions [17].
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Figure 24: Offline analysis

The output of the compiler allows for the identification of branch instructions and
their target address. This information was used to generate monitoring graphs as shown in
Figure 24 for five MiBench [13] applications (bitcount, qsort, stringmatch, basicmath and
dijkstra) and malicious stack-smashing attack code. Monitoring graph information for all
Mibench applications can be generated using offline analysis and our examination of all
MiBench benchmarks determined that the target for all dynamic branches could be
determined at compile time.
The attack code we use for our system is a simple C function which accepts a
character string from an I/O port and copies it to a buffer located on the processor stack [36],
as shown in Figure 24. The attack code was generated by Kekai Hu.

42

void process_input(char *stringpassed) {
char name[90];
strcpy(name,stringpassed);
printf("Processing string .. !\n");
return;
}

Figure 25: Attack code

In this poorly designed code, no check is made to determine if the string stringpassed
is longer than the target buffer, so the return address of the function can be over-written with
an address which points into the user-provided input string. Instead of characters, this “string”
can contain processor instructions which repetitively print out “Attacked!!” on a terminal in a
loop, although much more malicious behavior could be imagined. A monitor for the code is
able to detect the unplanned control flow jump and kill the process before the attack can
perform this activity. The hash value stored in the monitoring graph for the application will
not match the values for the malicious instructions as they are executed during the attack. As
shown in the Figure 26, we have confirmed that this attack will lead to unexpected results (an
attack message) if monitoring is not used.

Figure 26: Console display during stack smashing
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6.2. Monitor Context Management
The ability to perform numerous context switches between multiple processes of the
two monitored MiBench benchmarks have been verified both via simulation and in emulation
hardware. This switch includes both standard process state used by the processor (e.g.,
register information, stack) and monitoring information using the mechanism outlined in
Chapter 5. Altera SignalTap, a hardware debugger, was used to generate the waveforms
shown in Figure 27.

PID change

Context Switch

Monitor ready

CPU ready

Figure 27: SignalTap waveforms showing monitor context switch

The waveforms show the synchronization between the processor and the monitor as a
result of the context switch. First, the processor notifies the monitoring system of the switch
by writing the PID of the next process into the processor interface. The monitor switch is
started by the processor writing into the Operation register of the interface. The value of the
address_pointer for the old process is stored and the value for the new process is restored
to/from PID address storage immediately after this trigger. The base address registers are
then configured using the write_data port shown in Figure 18. After the control FSM
performs the monitor update, the Done signal is set in the processor interface indicating the
monitor context switch is finished. Finally, after the processor finishes other context switch
operations, it sets the Enable signal in the processor interface to restart monitoring. The
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processor waits a cycle until this write is complete. Monitoring for the new process starts
with the first instruction received from the process.
Experiments in simulation and in lab on FPGA hardware showed that the processor is
able to process data for the MiBench benchmarks equally fast both with and without
monitoring (e.g., no slowdown for monitoring). Context switch time is extended by 5 cycles
versus no monitoring to allow for monitor context switches. This overhead accounts for the
data exchanges between the processor and the monitoring system for synchronization.
Overall, we found that the number of cycles needed to perform a monitor context switch is 18
versus the 34 cycles needed for the processor to save and restore registers (note that monitor
and processor context switch occur in parallel).
6.3. Monitor Process Creation and DMA interface
The system has been verified for its ability to load new graph information into the
hardware monitor when a new process is created in the embedded processor. If the graph
information is not available in the graph memory of the monitoring system, then the required
graph information is copied from the centralized graph memory through the DMA interface.
Figure 28 illustrates SignalTap waveforms for process creation activity in the monitor.

GID change

PID change

Task Create Monitor ready

Figure 28: SignalTap waveforms showing monitor process creation

The processor first writes the identifiers (GID and PID) of the new process into the
processor interface. The monitor process creation begins when the processor sets a bit in the
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Operation register of the processor interface. If the graph information is present in the
monitoring system, the new base addresses are configured using the write_data port shown in
Figure 18. After the control FSM is complete, the Done signal is set in the processor interface
to indicate the monitor task creation is finished.
If the GID of the new process is not found in the GID to frame binding storage, then
the graph information for the process needs to be copied from the centralized graph memory.
Figure 29 illustrates SignalTap waveforms during DMA operation when a graph is copied
from the centralized graph memory to the monitoring system. It can be seen from the
waveform that the DMA operation begins when DMA_start signal is set high. The GID of the
graph to be copied is written into the GID port and this information is used to locate the graph
in the centralized graph memory. Once the graph is located, the graph copy operation begins
by setting the DMA_wren signal high. The address and data of the new graph are transferred
using the DMA_address and DMA_data port shown in Figure 20. Once the DMA operation is
complete, the DMA_done signal goes high.

Task Create

Graph copy starts

Graph copy ends

Figure 29: SignalTap waveforms showing monitor task creation

The amount of time needed to create a new process in the OS is about 600 clock
cycles versus 20 to create process information in the monitor. If a monitoring graph is loaded
from main memory, the cycle count required for the monitor increases to include reading the
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number of rows in the monitoring graph for the new process into graph memory. It is noted
that the number of rows in the monitoring graph is about 120 for each of our applications.
6.4. Attack Detection and Protection
It has been verified in both simulation and in hardware that the monitoring system is
able to detect the stack smashing attack described above and notify the processor so that the
malicious process can be terminated. SignalTap waveforms derived from observing hardware
operation in system are shown in Figure 30. As described in Chapter 5, an attack is detected
when the hash of the CPU instruction does not match the expected value stored in the
monitoring graph for the application. In the implemented system, the hash function counts the
number of ones in the instruction to form a four-bit hash value. The figure shows the four bit
hash value, a one-hot version of the hash value, and the retrieved, expected hash value for the
instruction from the monitoring graph (read_data[15:0]). In the waveform, it can be seen that
the correct hash value is matched twice, but the third hash value is incorrect, indicating a
branch to an unexpected section of code. As a result of this detection, a recovery signal is
generated, notifying the processor that the process should be terminated.

Attack detected

Instruction hash doesn’t match graph memory

Instruction hash matches graph memory

Figure 30: SignalTap waveforms showing detection of an attack
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This recovery signal is used to generate an interrupt to the embedded processor. The
interrupt causes the current process (which is also the malicious process) to halt and OS takes
control over the processor. The OS saves the CPU registers and starts executing the interrupt
handler. The interrupt handler determines what caused the interrupt to occur and starts
executing ISR for that interrupt. In the ISR, the attack process is found by checking the PID
of the process from the PID register of the processor interface. This process is then deleted
and the ISR is exited. Now the OS scheduler determines the next ready task to run and starts
executing it on the processor. Figure 31 shows the attack process being detected and deleted
in NIOS II processor. It can also be seen from the figure that after the deletion of the attack
process, the processor starts the execution of the next process.

Figure 31: Console Display showing task detection and deletion

While the attack process is being deleted, its corresponding graph information is also
removed from the monitoring system. SignalTap waveforms for graph deletion activity in the
monitor are illustrated in Figure 32. In the waveform, it can be seen that the graph removal
process starts when the processor writes into the Operation register informing about the task
delete operation. The Kill_PID signal is made high to remove the corresponding PID entry
from the PID addresses storage and the PID to GID binding storage. At the same time,
Update_GID signal is made high to update the GID to frame binding storage. In the
waveform it can be seen that the monitor removes PID-1 from the valid array of PID
addresses storage and updates the valid array entry for GID-1 in GID to frame binding
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storage by decrementing it by one. We can see that only the graph information for PID-0 and
GID-0 exists in the monitor which corresponds to the Task 1 running on the processor as
shown in Figure 31.

Task Delete

PID-1 removed from Valid PIDs

GID-1 decremented in Valid GIDs

Figure 32: SignalTap waveforms showing monitor task delete

The time it takes for the system to recover after an attack is detected is reported in
Table 1.
Operation

# Cycles

Interrupt Latency

1

Saving CPU registers

25

Interrupt Handler

129

ISR Code

30

Task Delete

126

Total

311

Table 1: System recovery time
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From the table, we can see that the interrupt latency is 1 cycle. Thus only 2
instructions of the attack code are executed on the processor and the attack task is killed
before it can harm the system. Once the interrupt occurs, the OS takes control and saves the
CPU registers. After this, the interrupt handler is called to determine what caused the
interrupt to occur. The interrupt handler also disables certain OS features like context
switching. Later the ISR code is executed, which determines the attack task by reading the
PID register of the processor interface and deletes this task. The task delete operation takes
126 cycles. Overall, it takes 311 cycles to recover from the attack and to continue normal
operation. Figure 33 illustrates the recovery process in the embedded system.

TIME
NIOSII

MONITOR

INVALID INSTR.
TASK EXECUTION

RECOVERY SIGNAL

SAVE CPU
REGISTERS
INTERRUPT
HANDLING
EXECUTE ISR
CODE

TASK DELETE
DELETE ATTACK
TASK

Figure 33: Recovery process in the embedded system
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6.5. Monitoring System Resources
To provide some context regarding the amount of overhead required by the
monitoring system relative to the processor, hardware results of the system reported by the
Altera Quartus II tool are shown in Table 2. The lookup table (LUT), flip-flop (FF), and
memory resources required for the monitor are appropriate compared to the processor core.
Dynamic power values are also shown in the table. These power numbers were generated
using Altera PowerPlay. Toggle rate of 12.5 was used for all the signals during power
analysis.

Resources

Available

Hardware

Nios II

DDR2

Monitor

Processor

Controller

LUTs

516

1,348

5,989

182,400

FFs

525

1,235

8,003

182,400

Mem. bits

131,296

44,032

250,368

14,625,792

Pwr (mW)

46.83

105.97

672.74

-

Table 2: Resource use on DE4 FPGA

Table 3 shows the graph size for the Mibench applications used for evaluating the
system. The graph size determines the time it takes to copy a new graph from the centralized
graph memory to the monitoring system. It can be seen from the table that the average
number of memory entries is 120. In the table, the number of memory entries for an
application is higher than the application instructions because we use DFA representation of
graphs and hence control instructions have multiple entries in the graph based on their target
addresses.
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Application

# Application Instr.

# Mem. entry

qsort

96

111

bitcount

60

74

basicmath

107

132

stringmatch

77

97

dijkstra

166

188

Table 3: Monitoring graph size

Table 4 reports the cycle count and time delay for each operation in the embedded
processor and the hardware monitor. Both the embedded processor and the hardware monitor
operate at a clock frequency of 100 MHZ. It is clear from the table that the hardware monitor
requires less time than the embedded processor to perform the same operation and hence
doesn’t slowdown the embedded system.

Operation

# Cycles

Time (us)

Nios II

Monitor

Nios II

Monitor

Task Create

600

~140

6

1.4

Context Switch

34

18

0.34

0.18

Task Delete

126

8

1.26

0.08

System Recovery

311

8

3.11

0.08

Table 4: Cycle count and time delay for various operations
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6.6. Dual-Core Monitoring System
The functionality of our dual-core monitoring system was verified by using two NIOS
II processors. Both the processors use the DDR2 available on the DE4 board to store
application binaries and OS kernel. The DDR2 address space was partitioned in two to enable
the storage of both processor binaries without data corruption as shown in Figure 34. As
earlier, the monitoring logic and centralized graph memory were implemented in on-chip
resources.

DDR2
00000000h-1FFFFFFFh

NIOSII 1

20000000h-3FFFFFFFh

NIOSII 2

Figure 34: DDR2 address space partition to support dual Nios II core

To verify our dual-core monitoring system, a collection of Mibench applications were
assigned to each processor. Both the monitoring systems were able to successfully load the
required graph information from the centralized graph memory. Altera SignalTap waveforms
illustrated in Figure 35 shows graphs being transferred from the centralized graph memory to
both the monitoring systems upon request.
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Monitor1 makes
request

Graph Copy

Monitor2 makes
request

DMA becomes
free

Figure 35: SignalTap waveform showing graph transfer in dual-core monitoring system

In the waveform, Monitor1 requests to access the centralized graph memory by
setting Req1 high. Since DMA_done signal is low, a connection is established between
Monitor1 and the centralized graph memory. DMA_start signal is set high to indicate the start
of the DMA transfer operation. We can see in the waveform that graph data and the graph
address are being loaded from the DMA controller to the RAM data and RAM address of
Monitor1. During this time, it is seen that Monitor2 makes a request to access the centralized
graph memory by setting Req2 high, but since DMA_done signal is low, it is made to wait till
the DMA_done signal goes high to indicate that the centralized graph memory is free to use.
Once DMA_done signal is high again, a connection is established between Monitor2 and the
centralized graph memory and similar operation is followed to transfer the required graph
from the centralized graph memory to Monitor2.
After all the required graphs are loaded into the individual monitoring systems,
operations such as process creation and context management occur in the same manner as in
the case of a single core monitoring system. We have also verified that both the monitoring
systems can track the progress of instruction flow on the respective cores without any
performance slowdown. If any attack occurs on either core, its respective monitoring system
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Graph Copy

is able to detect the attack and the attack process is killed without disturbing the other core
and the other tasks running on the same core.
Table 5 shows the hardware results reported by the Altera Quartus II tool for the dualcore embedded system with monitoring hardware. Toggle rate of 12.5 was used for all signals
during power analysis using Altera PowerPlay.

Resources

Available

Dual-Hardware

Dual-Nios II

DDR2

Monitor

Processor

Controller

LUTs

1,071

2,477

5,989

182,400

FFs

1,129

2,354

8,003

182,400

Mem. bits

262,592

88,064

250,368

14,625,792

Pwr (mW)

74.54

187.78

672.74

-

Table 5: Resource use for dual-core embedded system
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The system that has been designed and prototyped achieves the security requirements
that are put forth in Chapter 3. The key observation is that the hardware monitor can detect
when a specific task executes code that is different from the binary. In such a case, the hash
value that is reported from the processor core to the monitor does not match. There is a
chance that the attacker is lucky and the hash matches by coincidence or the attacker is clever
and aims to construct code that matches. This action however is very difficult to achieve in
practice and can be defeated by hiding the hash function [15]. If the monitor detects deviation
from the binary, then the processor is signaled to stop execution of the attacked task. Thus,
SC1 (no execution of attack code) is achieved.
The system supports multiple tasks that are switched dynamically by the operating
system. The hardware monitor follows along in sync and associates the current task on the
processor core with the correct monitoring graph. Thus, we achieve SC2 (secure processing
for multiple tasks).
Finally, when an attack occurs, the hardware monitor informs the operating system
about the attack and the targeted tasks are stopped using a conventional task termination
mechanism (similar to the kill command). This mechanism is specially designed to not affect
other tasks. Thus, SC3 (isolation of attacked task) is achieved.
We rely on the limitations of attacker capabilities, such as AC4 and AC5 (no
tampering of operating system or hardware monitor), to ensure that an attacker cannot
circumvent the security mechanism we have put in place.
To conclude, in this thesis, an important security extension for embedded processors
that execute multiple processes under the control of an operating system is presented. This
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monitoring approach allows the operation of each process to be tracked at the instruction
execution level. If a deviation from the expected instruction execution sequence is detected,
the monitor can quickly identify and notify the processor to initiate process termination. A
significant contribution of the work is the inclusion of multi-context support in the
monitoring system. Monitoring state for each process can be quickly saved during a process
context switch and previously stored state can be reloaded. Using prototyping, it was seen
that the system is effective for multiple processes managed by an embedded OS. A stack
smashing attack is identified and suppressed. The monitoring system is modest in size and
does not impact the application execution time.
In the future, we plan to extend our monitoring approach for a multi-core embedded
processor. We also plan to look into the possibility of monitoring the operating system along
with application monitoring. A more powerful operating system like µClinux could be used
for future works.
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